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It is not uncommon to find that Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) scenarios and Process Safety 
Valve (PSV) calculation cases do not align.  The intent of PHA studies, typically performed 
using the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method, is to identify all plausible hazard scenarios 
and the risk of those events occurring by assessing potential causes, consequences, safeguards, 
and independent protection layers.  The intent of the PSV protection layer is to provide relief 
capacity for all plausible overpressure scenarios.  Therefore, HAZOP scenarios related to 
overpressure and PSV calculation cases should align.  Lack of alignment between the HAZOP 
and the PSV calculation file creates problems in completeness, quality, and clarity.  Lack of 
alignment also creates engineering rework and “churn” as inconsistencies are discovered and 
resolution is needed.  A simple solution is proposed.  Each PSV calculation case that is 
considered plausible should contain a direct reference to the related HAZOP scenario, preferably 
in the summary matrix.  Likewise, each HAZOP scenario should reference the related PSV case.  
New or modified PSV calculations and new or modified HAZOP summary sheets associated 
with plant modifications or engineering document corrections should include this cross-
referencing.  Where broader changes are introduced, such as changes to engineering assumptions 
for PSV calculations or changes to HAZOP scenario protocol, the Discipline Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs) responsible for approving those changes must consider the impacts to the related 




1  Background / Problem Statement 
 
It is commonly understood that an integral relationship exists between Process Safety Valve 
(PSV) calculations and Process Hazard Analyses (PHAs).  (Note:  PHA studies are commonly 
conducted using the HAZOP method.  The terms PHA and HAZOP may be used 
interchangeably in this paper.)  PSV calculations are considered Process Safety Information 
(PSI) documents and these calculations are widely understood to be critical reference 
information for conducting PHAs (29 C.F.R. 1910.119 (d)(3)(i)(D) (1992, as amended); Center 
for Chemical Process Safety, 2008: 61-62). However, while these documents are consistently 
used as reference documentation for PHA studies, PHA teams often find that the scenarios 
considered viable and documented on PSV calculations do not always align with scenarios 
considered plausible on the PHA.  The reverse is true as well.  All cases deemed plausible by the 
PHA team on the HAZOP study are not always recognized or considered plausible by the 
persons performing and approving the PSV calculations.  This situation results in a mismatch 
between credible scenarios documented on the PHA and cases documented and assessed on the 
PSV calculations.  
 
The lack of consistency between the two data sources leads to incomplete analysis of the hazards 
and requires additional engineering work or rework to resolve differences.  Additional 
documents may be created that reference the PHA and the PSV calculations, such as safety 
system override hazard assessments.  These documents also become out-of-date when the source 
documents do not align.  Those additional documents will require rework to assure consistency 
with all approved process safety information. 
 
When mismatches between reference PSI documentation are found, PSVs generally are not 
credited in the Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and may not be credited in the HAZOP 
until resolution is completed.  In this situation, the HAZOP and LOPA studies will not properly 
represent relative risks.  Personnel utilizing these studies, including management, operations, and 
engineering, will be using incomplete information for decision making.  Projects involving risk 
mitigation work may not be properly prioritized until gaps between source data and summary 
reports are resolved.  Hazard assessments utilizing this data may also be compromised. 
 
While revalidation or rework of PSV calculations to current engineering and industry standards 
may be a necessary task in some instances, PSV calculations are time intensive work and 
repeated rework is not a value added activity for operating companies.  Likewise, the PHA study 
report is a primary source document for understanding and assessing ongoing risk.  This 
document is expected to fully capture and assess process safety risks within the operation.  Gaps 
and inconsistencies between the PHA report and the data sources expose operating companies to 
risk, liability, and potential non-compliance findings. 
 
 
2  Causes of the Problem:  Why do these gaps occur? 
 
Reasons that these gaps and discrepancies occur include the following: 
 
1) Multiple owners within one organization: 
a. Different discipline group owners:  Typically in larger operating companies, 
PHAs, in particular 5-year HAZOP revalidation studies, and PSV calculations are 
managed by different groups.  Process Hazard Analysis studies are typically 
managed by Process Safety or Technical Safety Engineering teams or groups.  
Relief system studies and PSV calculation completion and approval tasks are 
generally owned by Process Engineering.  While the groups may be closely 
related, the technical policies and procedures may have different owners.  Those 
procedures are typically derived from different regulations and standards, such as 
OSHA for PHA (29 C.F.R. 1910.119 (e), 1992, as amended) and API for PSV 
calculations (API 521, 2014).  The different standards and procedures offer 
differing methods to identify hazards.  Multiple methods may lead to different 
findings.  No expectation is generally given to correlate and reconcile the hazards 
identified.   
i. Contract Engineering:  The same problems occur when contract engineers 
are given work scope by Process Engineering or Process Safety 
Engineering groups.  Relief system studies and PSV calculations are often 
outsourced to engineering firms.  These firms will meet the requirements 
set by the client.  If there is not an expectation for alignment with PHA 
scenarios, the PSV calculations will be done in isolation.  The PHA study 
may not be provided as a reference.  If alignment of the PHA and PSV 
calculations is required, that requirement must be stipulated and 
facilitated. 
b. Regional differences/different protocol:  In some companies, different regions 
within the same company may utilize slightly different standards and protocol 
which could lead to differing assessment results, such as standards on double 
jeopardy, etc.  Ultimately, the operating company or corporation must come to a 
single conclusion:  Is the scenario viable or not?  If the scenario is viable for a 
PSV calculation, it is also viable as a PHA hazard scenario.  The reverse is true, 
as well.  Interpretation will be involved, but a single standard must be accepted 
and agreed upon by the operating company.  
2) Broader organization goals vs. narrower group or individual roles: 
a. Working in silos:  PHA Teams may delegate or assign work to Process 
Engineering groups stemming from PHA Recommendations.  The Process 
Engineering group is tasked with completing the calculations not questioning the 
origin of the work. 
b. Task goal vs. ultimate business unit goal:  In some cases, the Process Engineers 
performing the PSV calculations may deem their task as a validation or a second-
set-of-eyes reviewing the potential overpressure scenarios.  As such, these 
engineers may wish to assess the scenario without having pre-conceived notions 
of what scenarios were considered viable by others.  This method may be a 
prudent approach for validating scenarios; however, in conjunction with 
delivering final products, the two sources must ultimately be reconciled and 
viable overpressure scenarios should align in documentation of record. 
c. Lack of outside of the box thinking:  Routinely in PHA studies, the gaps between 
PSV calculation cases and PHA scenarios are recognized.  A standard approach 
for addressing these gaps may be to create PHA Recommendations or Action 
Items to follow-up and rework the PSV calculations. While these follow-up 
actions may close individual gaps at the time that new calculations are completed, 
these actions items do not systemically address the root cause of the problem.     
3) Ineffective Management of Change (MoC): 
a. Management of Change (MoC) misses:  Theoretically, MoC is intended to pick 
up discrepancies and errors on projects and modifications.  However, reality is not 
always consistent with theory.  New projects may continue to miss discrepancies 
given the various groups and methods involved in assembling those data and 
analyses.  Without an explicit expectation for the documents to align, some 
amount of inconsistency may be deemed acceptable. 
b. MoC for Engineering Document Updates:  Operating companies not only remain 
in differing states of maturity regarding MoC on physical changes, but also 
regarding MoC on engineering documentation updates and corrections.  In some 
cases, isolated document updates or corrections may not receive the same rigor 
that physical changes and modifications receive.  Associated documents that may 
be impacted by the engineering updates and corrections may be missed.  
c. Missing applications for Management of Change (MoC):  In some instances, MoC 
may be missed altogether.  Companies are getting better at performing MoC on 
isolated modifications and changes.  Managing administrative change is generally 
understood to be a requirement but may be less evolved.  Fewer tools and 
methods are available to review wider administrative changes.  For example, 
technical guidance and best practices may change over time with regard to 
engineering evaluations. Technical guidance may become more conservative 
which may result in larger relief capacity requirements.  If new technical guidance 
is introduced that impacts all PSV calculations of a given type, all PHA scenarios 
based for the same type of failure are also impacted.  The reverse is true as well.  
Changes in PHA scenario guidance to PHA teams may require additional process 
engineering work in order to assure those cases are captured in the PSV 
calculations.  Understanding the implications of those guidance changes and the 
resources required to follow-through must be understood and defined at the time 
that the guidance is changed. 
 
 
3  Solutions:  How do we prevent the problem? 
 
Now for the solution:  Disclaimer . . . this is not rocket science! 
 
First, define and communicate the new expectation and requirements.  The requirement may be 
described in the form of policy or procedural expectations for the PSV calculation cases and 
PHA scenarios to align one-to-one.  These policies and procedures are communicated via 
administrative management of change training.  However, training alone may not reinforce nor 
instill the practice.   
 
Institutionalizing the change may be as simple as modifying a standard form or template used to 
document PSV calculations and PHA scenarios.  Many companies include a summary matrix 
within the PSV calculation that includes typical API 521 scenarios, physical properties, and 
results of the calculations by scenario.  Adding a column to this summary matrix for PHA 
scenario cross-reference would facilitate gathering and easily locating that information.  Figure 1 
illustrates a sample PSV summary table that cross references the HAZOP Node/Scenario.  This 
table was derived from API Standard 521.  Companies that do not currently use this type of 
summary matrix may adopt the example provided in Figure 1 or create their own summary table.  
Populating this table completely should be a requirement for approval of new PSV calculations.   
 
The PHA scenarios should reference the appropriate PSV calculation case, as well.  There should 
be correlation between every viable PSV calculation case and every viable PHA scenario 
involving overpressure.  Some PHA scenarios based on non-pressure related deviations will also 
lead to overpressure and relate to PSV calculation cases as well.  The final PHA report should 
include appropriate cross-referencing. 
 
A more evolved solution would involve assembling all hazard and risk related data, including 
data associated with independent protection layers and safeguards, into a comprehensive 
database.  Having a single source for the data is preferred since source data should not be 
maintained in multiple locations.  A single database would facilitate easy searching, filtering, 
extraction, and downloading of data.  Discussion of developing such as database is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
As stated at the outset, the idea of cross-referencing PHA scenarios with PSV calculation cases is 
a simple concept and should be equally simple to implement.  However, recent experience 
indicates that this straightforward idea is currently not widely implemented.  Modifying the 
forms and templates used for PSV calculations and PHA documentation will provide reminders 
to the authors of the documents of the need to reconcile scenarios.  Concise, standard summary 
formats will support effective communication of key information.  These improvements assume 
that a mature and rigorous MoC process is in place where changes to process safety information 
are approved and documents are updated. 
 
More difficult to address are systemic problems associated with larger policy or procedural 
changes where higher level guidance changes may widely impact the operating company’s 
ability to maintain accurate and current PSI.  These issues must be addressed by management 
and technical authorities through rigorous application of administrative management of change at 
the time that changes to policy, procedure, or protocol are proposed. 
 
 
4  Examples 
 
Below are several examples that demonstrate how to put these simple ideas into practice.   
 
1) Modes of operation, process configuration:  Hazards should be considered for all typical 
or likely modes of operation.  If a piece of equipment may be operated in more than one 
process configuration, the PSV calculations and the PHA should reflect each of those 
modes of operation.  (Refer to Figure 2 for an example where a 2nd Stage Separator may 
be lined up with either a 1st Stage Low Pressure Separator or a 1st Stage High Pressure 
Separator.  Note:  there may be instances where HAZOP/LOPA methodology is applied 
which dictates that the consequences will be negligible; however, relief systems must be 
available and properly sized.  Those scenarios should be identified in both reference 
documents.)    
2) Differing assumptions:   
a. Configuration during hazard scenario:  Hazards associated with operating 
configuration should be considered in the PHA and in the PSV calculations in a 
manner consistent with company protocol.  One example:  assumptions regarding 
bypass valve position may vary over time or from company to company.  For 
configurations involving a bypass valve, the assumption may be:  1) bypass valve 
is open; 2) bypass valve is closed; or 3) consider both cases, bypass valve is open 
and bypass valve closed.  If both cases are considered, the likelihood of the event 
may differ between scenarios depending on frequency of operation of the bypass, 
administrative controls in place such as carseals, and company protocol and 
direction.  Most importantly, each scenario deemed viable based on company 
guidance should be identified in the PHA scenarios and the PSV calculation 
cases.  (Figure 3 illustrates an example of a scenario involving a bypass valve.) 
b. Technical assumptions in calculations:  Identifying hazard scenarios requires the 
team and/or individual to make various technical assumptions.  PSV calculations 
require numerous engineering assumptions in order to determine both required 
and available relief capacity.  One example:  A key assumption which drives both 
the hazard scenario and the PSV calculation is the potential pressure which may 
be introduced into a system.  The highest pressure which a system may see 
relative to the design pressure rating for that system drives the consequence for a 
given hazard scenario.  Depending on company protocol, the potential pressure 
seen by a downstream system may be limited by various upstream parameters 
such as:  an upstream mechanical protection device (consider upstream PSV 
setpoint); an upstream safety instrumented system (consider high-high pressure 
shut-down set-point); or even a normal operating pressure (least conservative 
assumption).  Generally, PSVs will be in place which protect downstream 
systems.  The relief capacity for those PSVs is calculated based various 
parameters including an assumed upstream or inlet pressure at the time that the 
PSV relieves, the PSV setpoint.  The required capacity will typically be defined 
by a maximum potential pressure further upstream (possibly an upstream node) 
flowing through a limiting device.  Whatever the assumption is for potential 
pressure in the hazard scenario, the PSV calculation should assume the same inlet 
pressure, or P1, when calculating the required capacity based on the upstream 
limiting device.  (Figure 4 provides an example of a system which could be 
overpressured up to 400 psig.  The upstream source of the 400 psig pressure is 
shown.  The same value is used in the calculation of the required relief capacity.) 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on the need for alignment of PHA scenarios with PSV calculation work.  
Both efforts have historically attempted to identify potential overpressure hazards using different 
approaches that have, in many cases, yielded different scenarios for consideration.  All credible 
overpressure scenarios should be considered from a risk and risk mitigation standpoint. 
 
A simple solution is proposed, cross-referencing HAZOP scenarios in PSV calculation summary 
information, and vice versa.  A sample template for a PSV calculation summary sheet containing 
this type of cross-reference is provided.  Similar cross-referencing should be shown in HAZOP 
report summary information.   
 
This paper assumes that traditional methods for calculating relief capacities of PSVs relative to 
relief requirements will remain an ongoing need.  This data is required in order to associate the 
relief device with HAZOP and LOPA credit.  Another related paper tackles the problem by 
considering risk based relief requirements which focus on dynamic analysis of worst case 
pressure achieved during potential relieving events.  Refer to “Practical Risk Based Approach to 
Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling System Design,” Casey Houston and Neil Prophet, GCPS 
2016, for more ideas on that approach.        
 
Although the concepts presented in this paper are relatively simple and straightforward, potential 
benefits to operating companies are significant if these ideas are implemented.  Benefits include 
more efficient use of resources and mitigation of risk and liability.  Contract engineering firms 
also benefit by increasing the likelihood that their work is well received by client users and that 
the work remains relevant for a longer period of time. 
 
Operating company management and technical authorities are key audience members for these 
ideas.  Managers and technical authorities are best positioned to implement new expectations for 
aligning these source documents and are responsible for considering unintended implications of 
wider protocol changes.  Where separate groups are responsible for related but distinct 
deliverables, higher level management must ensure alignment.            
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MAWP:  100 psig




MAWP:  225 psig




MAWP:  600 psig








MAWP:  200 psig
Normal Operating Pressure:  150 psig
To Flare
PSV-150A/B























































































Calculation	File	Number: PSVCALC-001-002-01 Rev Date By: Checked	By: Approved	By:
PSV	Tag	Number(s)	(covered	by	this	calculation): PSV-200A	/	PSV-200B PSV	Manufacturer: Governing	Sizing	Scenario:
PSV	Set	Pressure	(psig) 200 psig PSV	Model: Process	Fluid:
PSV	Type: Phase:
PSV	Set	Point	Basis: Known	or	Unknown Design	Rating	of	V-200 PSV	Inlet	Flange	Size: inches	(nominal)PSV	Outlet	Flange	Size: inches	(nominal) Allowable	Overpressure: %




















































Combine	common	relief	scenarios	with	single	identifier. Vapor Vapor for	Scenario Vapor for	Scenario [sg] [Z] [K] vs	SetPt vs	SetPt
(lbm/hr) (scfm) (in^2) (lbm/hr) (in^2) (in^2) (#) (lb/lb-mol) Cp/Cp-R (lb/ft^3) (cP) (lbm/hr) (psig) (%) (psig) (%)
1 Closed	or	Blocked	Outlets/Discharge	(Spurious	Closure	or	Human	Caused)
a Closed	or	Blocked	Outlets	(Fluids	from	HP	Separator) 200.1.1 4890 1237 0.322 4660 0.307 0.614 2



















































Figure 3: Assumptions on valve position affect hazard scenario development 









HH setpoint:  375 psig
H setpoint:  Variable
Normal Operating 







Scenario 300.1.1 Overpressure caused by Blocked Flow
Scenario 300.1.2 Overpressure caused by Control Valve Failure
Case a:  Assumes Bypass Valve V-2001A is closed during relief scenario
Case b:  Assumes Bypass Valve V-2001A is open during relief scenario









































































































PSV	Set	Point	Basis: Known	or	Unknown Design	Rating	of	V-3001 PSV	Outlet	Flange	Size: inches	(nominal) Allowable	Overpressure: %

















































Combine	common	relief	scenarios	with	single	identifier. Vapor for	Scenario Vapor for	Scenario [sg] [Z] [K] vs	SetPt vs	SetPt
(lbm/hr) (in^2) (lbm/hr) (in^2) (in^2) (#) (lb/lb-mol) Cp/Cp-R (lb/ft^3) (cP) (lbm/hr) (psig) (%) (psig) (%)
1 Closed	or	Blocked	Outlets/Discharge	(Spurious	Closure	or	Human	Caused)
a Closed	Outlet	V-3002A	(Assumes	Bypass	Valve	V-3001A	closed	during	relief) 300.1.1a 950 0.063 1652 0.110 0.220 1
b Closed	Outlet	V-3002A	(Assumes	Bypass	Valve	V-3001A	open	during	relief) 300.1.1b 6950 0.463 1652 0.110 0.220 Not	Adequate
c Closed	or	Blocked	Outlets	(Scenario	3	.	.	.	)
2 Inadvertent	Valve	Opening	(Full	Open,	Fail	Open	or	Human	Caused)
a Inadvertent	Valve	Opening	(Failure	of	Automatic	Controls)	w/Bypass	Closed 300.1.2a 1460 0.097 1652 0.110 0.220 1





















































Required relief capacity of the PSVs is be based on maximum calculated potential flowrate 
through the upstream valves.  Control valve flowrate may be calculated using Fisher Valve 
Sizing equations: 
   
 
 
The upstream pressure P1, valve inlet pressure, should be the same value assumed in the hazard 
scenario for maximum potential pressure.  In this example, the maximum potential pressure is 





HH setpoint:  375 psig
H setpoint:  Variable
Normal Operating 







Scenario 300.1.1 Overpressure caused by Blocked Flow
Scenario 300.1.2 Overpressure caused by Control Valve Failure
Case a:  Assumes Bypass Valve V-2001A is closed during relief scenario
Case b:  Assumes Bypass Valve V-2001A is open during relief scenario






























































































of	V-3001	resulting	in	.	.	.	 B 4 6
PSV-3001A/	PSV-
3001B;	
Operator	
response	to	
alarm
